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Abstract 
This dissertation was written as part of the LLM in Transnational and European 
Commercial, Arbitration, Mediation and Energy Law at the International Hellenic 
University.  !
This study focuses on the lifting of the corporate veil in UK and in Cyprus, as the latter 
has been applied as an exception to the principle of the separate legal personality of 
the companies in Common Law countries. The principle of the "veil of incorporation" 
was introduced in 1897 in Salomon v. Salomon & Co Ltd case in which the House of 
Lords brought into English law the twin concepts of corporate entity and limited liability. 
More specifically, the Court laid down the principle that a company is a distinct legal 
person entirely different from its members. However, the human intelligence and 
ingenuity started using the veil of corporate personality unlimitedly as a mean for fraud 
or improper conduct. As a result it became necessary for the Courts to lift the corporate 
veil in order to have the ability to look at the persons behind the company who are the 
real beneficiaries of the company. In regard with the above and pursuant to the need to 
ensure the proper use of the concept of the corporate veil, the doctrine of the lifting of 
the corporate veil was born. Further to the courts’ approach when lifting the corporate 
veil, the same appears in the legislation of the two countries too, as one can notice that 
beside the judicial grounds there are existing legal grounds for the lifting of the 
corporate veil.  !
If we want to give an explanation of the “Lifting of the corporate veil” it is crucial to 
mention that according to the lifting of corporate veil there is a possibility to disregard 
the corporate personality and look behind the real person who are in the control of the 
company. In other words, where a fraudulent and dishonest use is made of the legal 
entity, the individuals concerned will not be allowed to take shelter behind the corporate 
personality. In this respect the court will break through the corporate shell and apply the 
principle of what is known as “lifting or piercing through the corporate veil.” !
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31. 01. 2017 !!
!
!!!!!!!!!!!!!
 
Preface 
First of all, I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my supervisor, Professor 
Thomas Papadopoulos, for the patient guidance and advice he has provided 
throughout my time as his supervising student. I have been extremely lucky to have a 
supervisor who responded promptly to my questions and queries. His guidance has 
been valuable and helped me in all the time of writing of this thesis. !
Beside my supervisor, I would also like to thank all the members of staff at International 
Hellenic University and in particular Professor Komninos Komnios for his help, 
motivation and his willingness to answer to my questions not only during the writing of 
this dissection but also during all the time of the LLM programme. !
My sincere thanks also goes to my parents for the moral and financial support and 
patience. Your wise counsel and kind words have, as always, served me well. !
I would also like to thank my friend Katerina, for her continued support and 
encouragement. She experienced all of the ups and downs of my work in this paper. I 
am indebted to her for her help. !
Last but not least, completing this work would be more difficult without the support and 
friendship provided by my friend and colleague Stephanie, to whom I own special 
thanks for her motivation and inspiration in all the time of this LLM Programme. Special 
thanks for the stimulating discussions, for the sleepless nights we were working 
together before our exams and deadlines, and for all the fun we have had in the last 
year.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
                                                                                      Mina Sokratous 
                                                                                      31. 01. 2017  
 
Contents 
ABSTRACT 3 ....................................................................................................................
PREFACE 4 .......................................................................................................................
CONTENTS 5 ....................................................................................................................
INTRODUCTION 1 ..........................................................................................................
CHAPTER I   2 ..................................................................................................................
“THE VEIL OF INCORPORATION” - THE COMPANY AS A SEPARATE 
LEGAL ENTITY 2 .............................................................................................................
1.1 THE SEPARATE LEGAL PERSONALITY 2 ........................................................
1.2 SALOMON V. SALOMON & CO LTD - FULL ANALYSIS  3 ............................
1.3 CONSEQUENCES OF SEPARATE CORPORATE PERSONALITY 6 ................
1.4 LIMITED LIABILITY OF COMPANIES UNDER COMMON LAW 6 ................
CHAPTER II 8 ...................................................................................................................
“LIFTING” OR “PIERCING” OF CORPORATE VEIL - OVERALL 
DIMENSION OF THE CONCEPT 8 ...............................................................................
2.1 “LIFTING” OR “PIERCING” OF THE CORPORATE VEIL 8 .............................
2.2 GROUNDS UNDER WHICH THE CORPORATE VEIL IS LIFTED IN 
UNITED KINGDOM 9 .................................................................................................
2.2.1 LEGAL LIFTING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL IN UNITED KINGDOM 
9 
2.2.2 JUDICIAL LIFTING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL IN UNITED 
KINGDOM 12 
2.3 GROUNDS UNDER WHICH THE CORPORATE VEIL IS LIFTED IN 
CYPRUS 18 ...................................................................................................................
2.3.1 LEGAL LIFTING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL IN CYPRUS 19 ................
2.3.2 JUDICIAL LIFTING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL IN CYPRUS 22 ..........
2.4  A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE APPROACH ADOPTED IN UK 
AND IN CYPRUS REGARDING THE LIFTING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL 25 .
CHAPTER III 27 ...............................................................................................................
OVERALL CRITICAL ASSESSMENT  27 ....................................................................
 
!!
CONCLUSIONS 29 ...........................................................................................................
BIBLIOGRAPHY 30 .........................................................................................................
 
Introduction 
This study deals with the “piercing” or “lifting” of the corporate veil in legal systems 
based on common law, namely in UK and in Cyprus. The lifting of the corporate veil is 
one of the most debated issues as well as the most litigated one in corporate law. 
Talking about the lifting of the corporate veil, we must admit that, there is numerous 
literature and case law dealing with the issue but from my place, in this study, I will try 
to give my perspective of the topic adding my personal touch to the already given 
analysis by the literature. In this direction, dealing with the lifting of the corporate veil 
would be pointless if we do not approach the general principle of corporate veil as 
being introduced in the UK. According to the latter, the corporation is such an 
autonomous legal subject and corporate entities with limited liability are separate from 
their shareholders meaning that the shareholders and directors are covered by the veil 
of corporation and they cannot be held liable for their corporations' debts or any other 
obligations. Thus, the corporate veil can be characterized as the cornerstone of 
corporate law in common law jurisdictions as it enhances the limited liability character 
of the companies and gives actually a significant motivation   for anyone who wants to 1
incorporate a new company. As a consequence, Chapter I of this paper will focus on 
surveying the concept of company as a separate legal entity, as being established in 
the landmark decision in Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd. Additionally Chapter I will 
also include an analysis of the limited liability of the companies and the consequences 
of the latter to the development of the corporate law. 
However, although corporate veil constitutes the general rule protecting the 
shareholders and directors in the event of that company's financial or legal misconduct, 
it is not impenetrable as a concept meaning that the corporate veil can be under 
specific circumstances “lifted” or “pierced”. “Piercing” or “lifting” of corporate veil is 
undoubtedly the most commonly used doctrine to decide whether a shareholder or 
shareholders will be held liable for obligations of the company or not and as a 
consequence, this exception to the general rule of corporate veil, continues to be one 
of the most debatable doctrines in all of corporate law due to its complexity as a 
doctrine. More specifically, the lifting of the corporate veil is actually a legal decision 
with which the corporate veil is lifted or pierced and in such a case the shareholders 
are personally liable for the company’s obligations. Thus, it is quite clear that the 
piercing of corporate veil as a doctrine is only exceptionally applicable under specific 
circumstances and when is needed. To this direction, courts in various cases have 
established some criteria under which the lifting of corporate veil doctrine is necessary. 
The above-mentioned criteria for using the lifting of corporate veil doctrine as well as 
an analysis of the doctrine, as the latter has been expressed by case law in Cyprus 
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! Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 5, at 97 1
and in UK, will be the main content of chapter II of this dissertation. Chapter II will also 
include a comparative analysis of the approach of the examining countries regarding 
the corporate veil. Finally, Chapter III gives an overall assessment of the paper where 
the reader can understand my perspective of the whole topic. 
!!
Chapter I   
“The veil of incorporation” - The company as a separate legal entity 
As mentioned above in the introduction, this chapter will focus on the principle of the 
veil of incorporation as it was specifically expressed in the so called Salomon v A 
Salomon & Co Ltd decision. The veil of incorporation is the cornerstone of the 
corporate law in Common law countries so it is undoubtedly an issue of significant 
importance in order to proceed with the analysis of the “lifting” of corporate veil in 
Cyprus and in UK later in this paper.  
1.1 THE SEPARATE LEGAL PERSONALITY 
Legal personality refers to the general and abstract capacity of a certain entity to 
operate as a legal subject.   In regard to the above definition of legal personality, the 2
courts in the so called decision Salomon v. A Salomon & Co Ltd introduced the 
general principle of the separate legal personality of the companies meaning that the 
corporation is an autonomous legal entity itself and it has its own rights and liabilities 
which are distinct  from the rights and liabilities of its shareholders. This means that the 
company is “a body of bodies”; technically, an artificial person composed of natural 
persons.   The right to incorporate and acquire a legal personality distinct from that of 3
the shareholders was a first step in separating the legal spheres of the enterprise 
owners or investors and that of the enterprise itself.   Historically speaking the concept 4
under which an artificial person has its own rights and obligations was firstly introduced 
by Roman law. However, although we can say that this concept was not an invention of 
English law, it is absolutely clear that a more noticeable development of the principle of 
separability of the legal personality of corporations was firstly reported in the 
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! J.E. Antunes, liability of Corporate Groups. Autonomy and Control in Parent-subsidiary 2
Rela tionships in US, Gennan and EU law. An International and Comparative 
Perspective, (Deventer/ Boston, MA Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, 1994), 57.
!  Harry G Henn and J A Alexander, Laws of Corporations ( 3rd edn, 1983), p145. 3
However, it is important to note here that sometimes the members of a company are 
themselves companies but in any case there will be natural person at the end of the 
chain.
!  J.E. Antunes, above Liability of Corporate Groups4
seventeenth century when the English judges tried to formulate a law of corporations 
for municipal corporations and church institutions.  And interestingly, the separate 5
corporate personality doctrine remains the foundation for corporate law which governs 
a lot of multinational corporations today.  Thus, it is understood that the doctrine of 6
separate personality of corporations remains until today under the spotlight due to its 
significance. 
1.2 SALOMON v. SALOMON & CO LTD - FULL ANALYSIS  
As mentioned above, the separate legal personality of an entity was established by the 
House of Lords in the landmark decision in Salomon v  A Salomon & Co Ltd (1897). 
The facts of Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd were as follows: Aron Salomon was a boot 
and shoe manufacturer and he was trading his products as a successful sole trader in 
the East End of London for 30 years. In Aron’s family there was a family pressure to 
give them a share in the business. Aron wished to extend the business, so 
consequently he decided to form a company to which he sold his own business. By the 
time Aron formed the company, the existing legislation required from every company to 
have a minimum number of seven members. Thus, the A Salomon and Co Ltd had as 
members Aron Salomon himself as well as six members of his family, his wife and his 
five children. That six members, who were referred as subscribers in the memorandum 
of A Salomon & Co Ltd, interestingly, held one share each as nominees. The core idea 
behind the above allocation of shares was of course that the company in reality was a 
‘one man company’. The purchase price was £38,782 and Salomon took 20,001 
shares and the six other family members took one share each. According to Lord 
Machanghten the purchasing price is “a sum which represented the sanguine 
expectations of a fond owner rather than anything that can be called a businesslike or 
a reasonable estimate of value”   The purchase price, as being analyzed in Farrar’s 7
company Law Book in Chapter 7, was to be paid as to 30.000 pounds out of money as 
it came in, which Salomon immediately returned to the company in exchange for fully 
paid shares 10.000 Pounds in debentures. What was the consequence, was that 
Salomon at the end of the day received only an amount of 1.000 Pounds in cash, 
10.000 in debentures and half of the nominal capital of the company in issued shares. 
Aron Salomon made a lot of efforts to get the company back to its feet. Such efforts, 
were the loan he and his wife lent the company and of course the fact that he 
mortgaged his debentures to obtained the necessary funds and then loan them to the 
company. However, none of these efforts was enough in order to get back the company 
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!  Karen Vanderkerckhove - Piercing the Corporate Veil_ A Transnational Approach-5
(2007) (1). p .25
!  8.Ph. I. Blumberg, (Hastings Int'/ & Comp. L. Rev. 2001), 301. See also A. Dignam and 6
J. Lowry, Company Law, (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2006), 15 et seq. 
!  1987. AC 22 at 49, HL.7
to its feet and the business subsequently collapsed. Therefore, the business went into 
liquidation and consequently, the assets of the company where forced into sale. The 
amount resulting from the sale of company’s assets was enough for paying the 
mortgagee but it was not enough in order to fully repay the debentures. As a result, 
Aron Salomon brought a claim against the company on the basis of the debentures 
held, as a secured creditor. The liquidator argued that Salomon could not rank ahead of 
other creditors. The liquidator’s argument was based in the fact that there was an 
identification between the company, A Salomon & Co Ltd and Mr. Salomon himself as 
the company carried on business on behalf of Mr. Salomon. Both the first instance 
judge and Court of Appeal held that the one-man company was an abuse of the 
Companies Act and Salomon appealed to the House of Lords  . More specifically, in the 8
first instance court Mr. Vaughan Williams J. took the view that the company was 'a 
mere nominee and agent' of Mr .Salomon   and the Court of Appeal followed with 9
another misconceived decision by stating that 'the formation of a company and issue of 
debentures…were a mere scheme' to enable Mr. Salomon to 'carry on business in the 
name of the company with limited liability contrary to the true intent of the Companies 
Act 1862.’   The House of Lords totally rejected the rulings held above by the courts 10
and held that Mr. Salomon could not be liable for the debts of the corporation because 
the debts of the corporation were not personal debts of Mr. Salomon as they were two 
separate legal entities; and that once the artificial person has been created, "it must be 
treated like any other independent person with its rights and liabilities appropriate to 
itself.”    11
Lord Macnaghten expressed a legal classic speech and observed quite firmly that:    12
“The company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to the 
memorandum, and, though it may be that after incorporation the business is precisely 
the same as it was before, and the same persons are managers, and the same hands 
receive the profits, the company is not in law the agent of the subscribers or trustee for 
them. Nor are subscribers as members liable, in any shape or form, except to the 
extent and in the manner provided by the Act. That is, I think, the declared intention of 
enactment.”  
 Thus, it is quite clear that Salomon’s case as been analyzed above has significant 
importance to the development of company law in common law jurisdictions that it is 
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!   J.H Farrar & B.M Hannigan, Farrar’s Company Law, 4th edition, 1998, p. 67.8
! Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22, at 25.9
! Ibid., at 9.10
! Salomon v. Salomon & Co. Ltd. [1897] A.C. 22.11
! Ibid. at p. 51.12
actually the law that this paper is concentrated on. It is therefore, widely accepted and 
recognized as the decision that establishes one of the most important principles of 
British company law  , indeed of company law of all common law systems, that a 13
company is a legal person independent and distinct from its shareholders and its 
managers. Moreover, the latter principle as we can notice from latest decisions has 
been consistently applied and it serves as a general guideline for every judge dealing 
with such cases in common law jurisdictions. 
Such cases in which the court followed the same approach   as in Salomon v A 14
Salomon & Co Ltd.  was in Macaura v  Northern Assurance Co. Ltd.   Likewise, the 15
principle of separate legal personality of companies has been widely used by the 
Courts in Cyprus too, as Cyprus belongs to the common law system countries. Thus, in 
Cyprus, there has been similar judicial support for the separate entity concept which is 
quite understood in cases like MATERO LTD ν. REPUBLIC, (1986) by the High court 
of Cyprus which explicitly refers to Salomon principle.    16
  -! -5
! P. Davies in Palmer's Company law (1992), 2228/1, no.2. 1 523. Salomon v. A Salomon 13
& Co Ltd concerned a cornerstone of English company law in general
! In the Canadian Supreme court case of Wadlyn Motels Ltd v Commerce General 14
Insuarance Co (1970) 12 DLR (3d)605, the court held that a company has no insurable 
interest in the assets of the principal shareholder.
! Macaura v. Northern Assurance Co. Ltd. [1925] A.C. 619. In this case Lord Sumner 15
concurred and said the following: 
“My Lords, this appeal relates to an insurance on goods against loss by fire. It is clear 
that the appellant had no insurable interest in the timber described. It was not his. It 
belonged to the Irish Canadian Sawmills Ltd, of Skibbereen, co Cork. He had no lien or 
security over it and, though it lay on his land by his permission, he had no responsibility 
to its owner for its safety, nor was it there under any contract that enabled him to hold it 
for his debt. He owned almost all the shares in the company, and the company owed him 
a good deal of money, but, neither as creditor nor as shareholder, could he insure the 
company's assets. The debt was not exposed to fire nor were the shares, and the fact 
that he was virtually the company's only creditor, while the timber was its only asset, 
seems to me to make no difference. He stood in no "legal or equitable relation to" the 
timber at all. He had no "concern in" the subject insured. His relation was to the 
company, not to its goods, and after the fire he was directly prejudiced by the paucity of 
the company's assets, not by the fire.”
! More specifically, the court in the aforementioned decision held that:  16
“One of the cornerstones of modern company law is the notion of separate corporate 
personality.This principle has been rigorously applied by the Courts since the case of 
Salomon v Salomon and Co Ltd [1897] A.C. 22.” 
1.3 CONSEQUENCES OF SEPARATE CORPORATE PERSONALITY 
In the preceding subchapters of this paper, I emphasized on the doctrine of separate 
corporate personality of the companies, starting from the definition of the latter and 
then continued with the analysis of the landmark case of Salomon and A Salomon & Co 
Ltd. Thus, I believe it is quite important to devote the next subchapter in quoting the 
consequences of the separate legal personality. As a result, one should consider the 
following traditional and modern corporate attributes of any corporation under common 
law: The first characteristic of companies which is also a consequence of the doctrine 
of separate corporate personality of the companies is that the company itself has 
perpetual succession. By the aforementioned term what we mean is that the company 
continues to exist even in the case in which its directors and shareholders die. "This 
unbroken personality, this beautiful combination of the legal characters of the finite with 
essentials of infinity appears to have been primary object if the invention of 
corporations"   as Grant wrote in 1850. 17
Moving on the next consequence of separate legal personality, a company owns its 
own property meaning that the legal owner of the assets of the company is not its 
shareholder but the company itself. The shareholders have an interest in the assets of 
the company indirectly through the medium of their shares. No other proprietary rights 
belong to the shareholders and consequently, the creditors of the company are not 
creditors of the shareholders meaning that in principle the creditors must go against the 
company. The above-mentioned consequence led us to the next conclusion which is 
that the company itself (in its own name) can freely sue or be sued which is in my 
opinion one of the most important consequences of the doctrine of separate corporate 
personality of the companies. Moreover, the company as an independent legal entity 
with separate corporate personality should be in compliance with the formalities of the 
Companies Act in UK as well as with the corresponding Companies Act in Cyprus. As a 
result, the Companies shall pay registration fees but also fees of the regular filing of 
documents and accounts with the registrar.  
1.4 LIMITED LIABILITY OF COMPANIES UNDER COMMON LAW 
!
The content of this subchapter, can be also mentioned as a consequence of the 
separate corporate personality of the companies. And this is because, although limited 
liability is not necessarily an attribute of the latter doctrine, the two concepts of limited 
liability and separate corporate personality are commonly connected in practice. 
However, in my opinion, the aforementioned concepts are separate and any effort to 
equate the two is wrong.  
  -! -6
!  Grant on Corporations (1850) Butterworths, p 4.17
Historically speaking, it is not easy to determine the period when limited liability 
emerged in the United Kingdom. However, on the legislative front, it was only in 1855 
and 1856 that the English Parliament enacted the first Limited Liability Act and the Joint 
Stock Companies Act.12   In any case, the concept of limited liability exists until today 18
and has significant importance to the development of company law. Regarding the 
concept of limited liability, the shareholders of a limited liability company are not, in 
principle, liable for the company’s debts and as a result the company itself, according 
to the doctrine of separate corporate personality, undertakes its own debts. The 
shareholders are liable to the company only on the par value of their shares; in 
principle, the shareholders do not risk more than their capital contribution.   Thus, it is 19
easily understood that the concept of limited liability as well as the concept of separate 
corporate personality is a great motivation to passive investors that do not participate in 
management to invest where they would not do if they would be exposed to the risk of 
unlimited liability.   Furthermore, it permits large-scale enterprises, where shareholders 20
would not be capable of bearing the risks involved and where it is impossible to involve 
the thousands of investors in management.  Limited liability encourages also the 21
development of public markets for stocks and thus helps make possible the liquidity 
and diversification benefits that investors receive from those markets.   So, there is no 22
doubt that the two concepts of limited liability and separate corporate personality, as 
being analyzed above, are actually a vital tool to the countries belonging to the 
common law system and more specifically to UK and Cyprus. However, the concept of 
the separate corporate personality of the companies with limited liability is not absolute 
and as we will see precisely in the next chapter the concept has some significant 
exceptions. 
  -! -7
! A. Dignam and J. Lowry, above (Company Law 2006), 17; S. Bowmer, 'To pierce or not 18
to pierce the corporate veil - why substantive consolidation is not an issue under English 
law' (2000) 15(8) J. lnt'l Banking L., 193. 
!  Karen Vanderkerckhove - Piercing the Corporate Veil_ A Transnational Approach-19
Kluwer Law International (2007) (1). p.24
! H.G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV, 1967, 20
p. 262-265. It is really important to mention that the separate corporate personality of the 
companies as well as the limited liability increases funding availability for projects that 
have positive net values, but carry too much risk in terms of potential to wipe out all of 
the investor's capital.
! H.G. Manne, above (Va. L. Rev. 1967), p. 262. 21
! Henry G. Manne, Our Two Corporation Systems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REV., 22
p.259, 262,1967 (publicly held corporations with many small shareholders could not exist 
without limited liability).
Chapter II 
“Lifting” or “Piercing” of corporate veil - Overall dimension of the concept 
This chapter focuses on the “lifting” or “piercing” of the corporate veil in Cyprus and in 
UK which, definitely, can be characterized as the core of the thesis. The terms of 
“lifting” or “piercing” are the two terms that are mostly used to designate the same 
reality. But there are some other terms in English that describe the same situation and 
these are the terms of “penetrating”, “ignoring”, “extending” or “parting” the veil,p 
“disregarding the corporate entity or personality”. In Greek the predominant term for the 
lifting of corporate veil which is repeatedly found in Cyprus cases and literature is 
“Άρση του εταιρικού πέπλου”. 
2.1 “LIFTING” OR “PIERCING” OF THE CORPORATE VEIL 
The “lifting” or “piercing” of the corporate veil as already mentioned above, is a legal 
decision with which the corporate veil is lifted or pierced and in such a case the 
shareholders are personally liable for the company’s financial and other obligations. 
When the courts pierce the corporate veil, they disregard the separateness of the 
corporation and hold a shareholder responsible for the corporation's action as if it were 
the shareholder's own.   Thus, it is quite clear that the concept of the “lifting” or 23
“piercing” of corporate veil totally opposes to the doctrine of the separate legal 
personality under which the company is an autonomous legal entity with independent 
legal personality which is the general principle of companies law in common law 
countries. Consequently, as the concept of the lifting of the corporate veil opposes to 
the general rule, the latter has exceptional application by the courts. But, when has 
such legal concept application by the courts? What does really lead the courts to 
ignore the independence of the company and concerns itself directly with the members 
or the directors of the company? The answers to the aforementioned questions are not 
strictly ascertained by the courts and the literature   as it is up to the courts discretion  24 25
to decide whether they should lift the corporate veil, meaning that the courts decide ad 
hoc when they should observe possible liability directly to the members of the company 
instead of the company itself. Such assessment is usually based in specific 
circumstances that justify the deviation from the basic rule of the principle of the 
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! R.B. Thompson, 'Piercing the corporate veil: an empirical study' (1991) 76 Cornell l. 23
Rev., p.1036.
! Warner Fuller, The Incorporated Individual: A Study of One-man Company, (1938) 51 24
Harv LR 1373, 1377.“It is impossible to ascertain the factors which operate to break 
down the corporate insulation.”
! Tata Engineering Locomotive Co v. State of Bihar AIR 1965 SC 40 “The matter is 25
largely in the discretion of the courts and will depend upon “the underlying social, 
economic and moral factors as they operate in and through the corporation.”
independent corporate personality.   In the following subchapters I will analyze the 26
grounds that lead to the lifting or piercing of the corporate veil as being introduced by 
the law of Cyprus and UK and of course as they have been introduced by the courts in 
several cases. In the context of the aforementioned analysis one must notice that the 
reasons justifying the lifting of the corporate veil are distinguished in the judicial 
grounds as well as in the legal grounds which will be referred also as the legal 
provisions.  
2.2 GROUNDS UNDER WHICH THE CORPORATE VEIL IS LIFTED IN UNITED 
KINGDOM 
The corporate veil is lifted or pierced under some specific extraordinary circumstances 
and to this end the courts in numerous cases has introduced some specific grounds 
that justify such deviation from the so called Salomon principle. These judicial grounds 
for the lifting of the corporate veil as well as the legal grounds for the piercing of the 
corporate veil in UK will be quoted in detail in the next subchapters. 
2.2.1 LEGAL LIFTING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL IN UNITED KINGDOM !
Undoubtedly, the locus classicus for legislation for the legal piercing of the corporate 
veil was expressed in the speech of the Lord Diplock in the Dimbleby & Sons v 
National Union of Journalists case  . Lord Diplock said: 27
“The “corporate veil” in the case of companies incorporated under the Companies Act 
is drawn by statute and it can be pierced by some other statute if such other statute so 
provides: but in view of its raison d’être and its consistent recognition by the courts 
since Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd, one would expect that any parliamentary 
intention to pierce the corporate veil would be expressed in clear and unequivocal 
language. I do not wholly exclude the possibility that even in the absence of express 
words stating that in specified circumstances one company, although separately 
incorporated, is to be treated as sharing  the same legal personality of another, a 
purposive construction of the statute may nevertheless lead inexorably to the 
conclusion that such must have the intention of the Parliament.” 
i) Less than statutory minimum members 
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! Odyssey (London) Ltd. v. OIC Run Off Ltd. (2000) TLR 201 CA It can be said “that 26
adherence to the Solomon principle will not be doggedly followed where this would cause 
an unjust result”.
!  1984, 1 WRL 427 at 435 B-G, HL.27
The first legal ground under which the lifting of the corporate veil is justified in UK is 
established  by the legislator in Section 24 of the Companies Act ('CA') 1985   which 28
provides that if a company carries on business without having at least two members 
and does so for more than 6 months, any person who is a member after those six 
months is liable jointly and severally with the company for the payment of its 
(contractual) debts. However, the aforementioned limitations by the Section 24 of 
Companies Act seems to be rarely invoked especially if we take into account that the 
single member private companies are allowed. Consequently, this reason of lifting the 
corporate veil constitutes a rather theoretical exception to the general rule of limited 
liability   and to this end the aforementioned provision has been deleted in the new 29
corporate legislation of UK, namely the Companies Act 2006.  
ii) Fraudulent and wrongful trading 
The second ground that justifies the lifting of the corporate veil and therefore deviates 
from the limited liability rule can be found in Section 213-215 of Insolvency Act 1986 
on fraudulent and wrongful trading. Fraudulent trading occurs when the business of a 
company has been carried on with the intent to defraud creditors of the company (or of 
any other person) or for a fraudulent purpose.   In such a case, the court may declare 30
that any persons who were knowingly party to the carrying on of the business in that 
manner are to be liable to make such contributions to the company's assets as the 
court thinks proper (Section 213 Insolvency Act 1986).   Because of the requirement 31
of fraudulent intent, Section 213 Insolvency Act 1986 (and its predecessor, Section 332 
Companies Act 1948) does not provide an easy ground for shareholder liability.  
The liability was also extended to wrongful trading which is without any doubt a much 
broader concept. The aforementioned extension of liability was proposed by the Cork 
Committee, which prepared the reform of English insolvency law during the 1980s and 
that propose was finally followed.   Section 214 of Insolvency Act deals with wrongful 32
trading and enable the court to make a declaration where a company has gone into 
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insolvent liquidation. More specifically, it provides for the same type of liability that may 
attach to any person who is or has been a director of a company that has gone into 
insolvent liquidation and that knew or ought to have concluded that there was no 
reasonable prospect that the company would avoid going into insolvent liquidation. At 
this point, we must note that the declaration is not to be made if the court is satisfied 
that the person took every step with a view to minimizing the potential loss to the 
creditors that he ought to have taken and to this end, the standard applied is one of a 
reasonably diligent person having the general knowledge, skill and experience to be 
expected of a person carrying out his or her functions in relation to a company and the 
general knowledge, skill and experience that he or she in fact has.   The importance of 33
Section 214 for liability in corporate groups lies in the extension of the term of the 
directors with the inclusion of shadow directors   which 'raises the very real prospect of 34
invoking Section 214  against the company's parent company’.   35
iii) Abuse of the company name  
Another important legal ground for lifting the corporate veil can be found in the 
Sections 216-217 of the Insolvency Act 1986. The aforementioned provisions 
explicitly refer to the liability of the directors or shadow directors who, having run a 
company that got into insolvent liquidation, form, within five years after the insolvency, 
another company with an identical or very similar name that buys the undertaking and 
assets from the original company and through which they continue to trade. These 
companies are well known as the 'phoenix companies'. More specifically, according to 
section 216 of the Insolvency Act, anyone who was a director of a company shadow or 
not, at anytime during the 12 months preceding its insolvent liquidation to be in any 
way concerned during the next five years in the formation or management of a 
company or a business with a name by which an earlier company was known or is so 
similar as to suggest an association, bears the liability.   Section 217 provides for 36
personal liability jointly with the company for the debts contracted during that period. 
However, the case law regarding the sections 216-217 of Insolvency Act as a ground 
for lifting the corporate veil seems that is rarely reported.   37
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2.2.2 JUDICIAL LIFTING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL IN UNITED KINGDOM 
!
The English courts have occasionally not applied the principle of separate corporate 
personality as been expressed in the Salomon case, known as the Salomon principle. 
These cases can otherwise be characterized as the exceptional cases in which the 
courts, rarely, do lift the corporate veil without statutory basis. “These cases are 
opaque and impassable”, according to Gower.   Griffin finds that shareholder’s liability 38
depends on “a degree of judicial subjectivity” and remains “tangled in a mesh of 
uncertainty”.   However, one must take into consideration that, in principle, the English 39
courts follow the traditional principle of the separate corporate personality, and to this 
end, even in the cases in which they have decided to lift the corporate veil they have 
not done this in a systematic way by defining the proper ends of incorporation. They 
have therefore, moved to a case to case assessment of the circumstances under which 
they should lift the corporate veil, except from the cases of course where such lifting of 
the corporate veil is introduced by the law (legal piercing).   40
However, although there is no unifying principle that leads the courts to the lifting of the 
corporate veil, the English courts have established through their decisions all over the 
years some judicial grounds for the lifting of the corporate veil. This can be understood 
in the Adams v. Cape Industries case, which is a case of great importance for the 
concept of the piercing of corporate veil in common law as the Court of Appeal 
analyses three possible grounds for piercing: fraud, agency, and the single economic 
unit theory.   But beyond these three grounds, all judicial grounds for the lifting of the 41
corporate veil by the courts of United Kingdom will be analyzed in detail below. 
i) Fraud 
The Salomon principle observed to be used in some cases as an engine of fraud. Such 
violence of the Salomon principle could not be allowed by the courts and consequently, 
the English courts have systematically use the concept of the lifting of the corporate 
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veil in order to combat fraud. Further to the above, the fraud can be definitely 
characterized as an important judicial ground for the lifting of the corporate veil in 
Common law as the presence of an element of fraud is the most commonly seen factor 
which lead the courts to acknowledge the personal liability of the shareholders of a 
company. The whole concept behind the ground of fraud is of course the fact that the 
veil should be lifted when the defendant acted pursuant to some improper or fraudulent 
motive creating or utilizing a corporate facade as a sham or device to achieve 
something which it could not otherwise lawfully do.   Therefore, there is no doubt that 42
the courts are quite strict in cases in which physical persons under their capacity as 
members or directors of the company, abuse the corporate form by using fraudulent 
tactics. The English courts are not willingness to approve fraudulent actions under the 
invocation of the Salomon principle and this can be explicitly understood throughout 
their decisions in which they have repeatedly lifted the corporate veil in cases of any 
kind of fraud, meaning that the fraud here covers criminal fraud but also covers 
equitable fraud. In Gilford Motor Co Ltd v Horne  , the managing director of the 43
company entered into a covenant in a service agreement not to solicit customers from 
his employers. However, in contrast to the above agreement upon leaving the 
company's employment Mr. Horne formed a company in his wife’s name to solicit the 
customers of the company and consequently, the company took some measures by 
bringing an action against him. The aforementioned case’s facts were assessed by the 
Court of Appeal which held that the new company formed by the director was a mere 
sham to cloak his wrongdoings and, therefore, he could be restrained from committing 
a breach.    44
Moreover, from Adams v. Cape Industries case can be extracted that the crucial point 
in such cases is the timing of the switch to a different corporate entity meaning that 
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reason for the failure of the fraud here was that the exception was the timing of 
incorporation of the sham company. Mr. Creasey brought an action against wrongful 
dismissal against his employers BW. BW served a defence but four months later he was 
served a notice saying that the company was insolvent. BM took over all the business 
except the plaintiff's claim. The plaintiff obtained an order for damages and interest 
however before he received anything. BW was dissolved without going into liquidation. 
The plaintiff sought an order substituting BM for BW on the grounds of justice. As to 
criminal fraud see eg Hare v Customs and Excise Comrs 1996, 140 Sol Jo 67, CA
!  See also Jones v Lipman, 1962, 1 ALL ER p. 442 in which a man contracted to sell his 44
land and thereafter changed his mind in order to avoid an order of specific performance 
he transferred his property to a company. Russel judge specifically referred to the 
judgments in Gilford v. Horne and held that the company here was "a mask which (Mr. 
Lipman) holds before his face in an attempt to avoid recognition by the eye of 
equity" .Therefore he awarded specific performance both against Mr.Lipman and the 
company. See also Re Bugle Press Ltd, 1961 Ch 270 CA
when it occurs before the accrual of the cause of actions the courts will not pierce the 
corporate veil but it is otherwise where the switch is made after the cause of action 
accrued.   More specifically, what it may be inferred from Adams v. Cape Industries 45
case is that a fraudulent motive can be found in cases which corporate transactions are 
sham and companies are used for the avoidance of existing liabilities.   In such a case 46
as described above as well as in a situation in which the companies are used as a 
facade behind which “they are hiding the proceeds of their smuggling” the veil can 
undoubtedly be pierced by the courts.   Thus, it is quite clear that the Courts have 47
been more than prepared to pierce the corporate veil when the elements of the case 
lead the judges to the conclusion that fraudulent tactics could be perpetrated behind 
the veil. 
ii) Agency 
Another important judicial ground for the lifting of the corporate veil in United Kingdom 
is the ground of agency. Agency, which is occasionally referred by the courts as 
“implied” or “constructive” agency   has been repeatedly cited as a ground of lifting of 48
the corporate veil by a lot of commentators in the United Kingdom.   As a general rule, 49
the construction of agency cannot be characterized as a strict ground for the lifting of 
the corporate veil, as the basic principle regarding the concept of agency is that the 
subsidiary is recognized as an independent legal person; The ground of Agency was of 
great importance to the landmark decision of Salomon v Salomon as in the 
aforementioned case o Justice Vaughan Williams expressed that the company was 
nothing but an agent of Solomon. "That this business was Mr. Solomon's business and 
no one else's; that he chose to employ as agent a limited company; that he is bound to 
indemnify that agent the company and that this agent, the company has lien on the 
assets………" However the House of Lords in straight contrast to the above held that 
the company was not automatically the agent of its shareholders. It was also held that 
such an agent relationship is not created automatically even in a situation of 98% 
controlling interest in a company by itself.    50
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Nevertheless, the courts in some cases were willing to construe an agency of the 
company for its members. Such willingness by the courts was expressed in the 
Salomon case which did not exclude the possibility of there being an agent relationship 
in fact. Moreover, in light of the principle that the subsidiary is recognized as an 
independent legal person it is important to assess the role of the close control by the 
parent corporation as this control can be considered to be used for the exercise of the 
activities of the parent company.   In such a case, it is clear that the parent corporation 51
is held liable for the acts of its agent, especially if we take into consideration that the 
agent acted with the authority of its principal. The aforementioned agency relationship 
was tested in Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd v Birmingham Corpn   case in which the 52
overall question of whether the subsidiary was carrying on a business as the parent’s 
business or its own was a question of fact. The court in order to give its answer to the 
question above has focused in the following factors: 
a) were the profits of the subsidiary those of the parent company? 
b) were the persons conducting the business of the subsidiary appointed by the 
parent company? 
c) was the parent company the “head and brains” of the trading venture? 
d) did the parent company govern the adventure? 
e) were the profits made by the subsidiary company made by the skill and direction of 
the parent company? 
f) was the parent company in effective and constant control of the subsidiary? 
At the end of the day Mr. Atkinson J held that the subsidiary was the “agent or 
employee; or tool or simulacrum of the parent company”.  Smith, Stone & Knight Ltd 
v Birmingham Corpn case as being held it is quite important as it has been followed 
by later decisions like the Hotel Terrigal Pty Ltd v Latec Investments Ltd (No 2) by 
the New South Wale Supreme Court   where the court disregarded a purported sale by 53
a mortgagee company of the mortgagee property to its wholly owned subsidiary for an 
improper purpose. However, one must take into consideration that the courts have 
been extremely reluctant to characterize a subsidiary, through their decisions, as the 
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agent of its parent for the transaction of the parent's business.   In Adams v. Cape 54
Industries, the argument based on agency failed through the court’s consideration that 
NAAC carried on its own business in the United States rather than that of Cape and/or 
Capasco; NAAC had no authority whatsoever to bind other group members to 
contracts for the supply or sale of asbestos.   Thus, must take into account that there is 55
no presumption of any agency relationship in the absence of an express agreement 
between the parties and if not so it will be difficult to establish one. Otherwise, in cases 
where the agency agreement holds good and the parties concerned have expressly 
agreed to such an agreement them the corporate veil shall be lifted and the principal 
shall be liable for the acts of the agent. 
iii) Single Economic Unit 
The ground of the single economic unit as we will see in the analysis above is linked in 
fact with the ground of agency. However, the single economic unit constitutes an 
independent judicial ground under which the courts have based in some cases their 
reasoning for the application of the concept of the lifting of the corporate veil.  But, what 
it is the ground of the single economic unit? The courts have sometimes shown a 
willingness to look upon a group of companies as a single economic unit   meaning 56
that the court based on the single economic unit theory can ignore the separate legal 
character of the members of a corporate group in order to treat them as one unit.  57
Interestingly, the single economic unit argument was received favourably in at least one 
famous case, in DHN Food Distributors v. Towler Hamlets London Borough 
Council   case in which it has been held that the Courts may disregard Salomon's 58
case whenever it is just and equitable to do so. More specifically, in the above-
mentioned case the Court of appeal thought that the present case was one which was 
suitable for lifting the corporate veil. In the DHN Food Distributors v Towler Hamlets 
London Borough Council case,  one company in the group owned the freehold and 
another company which carried on the business  on the premises was a bare licensee. 
The court of Appeal was prepared to recognize the economic unit of the group as a 
single entity to enable them to recover their compensation. Lord Denning has remarked 
that we know that in many respects a group of companies are treated together for the 
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purpose of accounts, balance sheet, and profit and loss accounts. Gower too in his 
book says, "There is evidence of a general tendency to ignore the separate legal 
group”. However it is quite clear that the court will pierce the corporate veil after an ad 
hoc assessment of the facts of the case and undoubtedly one of the most important 
indicators whether the court would pierce or not the corporate veil would be the nature 
of shareholding and control. 
However, although the ground of the single economic unit was received favourably in 
DHN Food Distributors v. Towler Hamlets London Borough Council case, it was later 
questioned as a ground and it was, indeed, explicitly doubted by the House of Lords in 
the case of Woolfsan   in which the house of lords held that there was "no basis 59
consonant with the principle upon which on the facts of this case the corporate veil can 
be pierced to the effect of holding Woolfson to be the true owner of Campbell's 
business or the assets of Solfred,” the two subsidiary companies that were jointly 
claiming compensation for the value of the land and disturbance of business. 
Furthermore the House of Lords added "properly applied the principle that it is 
appropriate to pierce the corporate veil only where special circumstances exist 
indicating that it is a mere facade concealing the true facts”. The ground of the single 
economic unit as a ground for the piercing of the corporate veil failed in the Adams v. 
Cape Industries case as well as in Bank of Tokyo Ltd.v. Karoon in which Mr Hoffmann 
explicitly stated the following: “it would be technical for us to distinguish between parent 
and subsidiary company in this context; economically, he said, they were one. But we 
are concerned not with economics but with law. The distinction between the two is, in 
law, fundamental and cannot here be bridged.   60
iv) Trust 
What is noticeable from the case law of the English courts, is that, occasionally, the 
courts based in the concept of trust their reasoning for the implementation of the 
piercing of the corporate veil in order to look at the characteristics of the shareholders. 
Here it is important to quote the Abbey Malvern Ltd v Ministry of Local government 
and Planning case   in which the court lifted the corporate veil. More specifically, in 61
Abbey Malvern Ltd v Ministry of Local government and Planning case a school was 
carried on in the form of a company, but the shares were held by trustees on 
educational charitable trusts. The court pierced the corporate veil in order to look at the 
terms on which the trustees held the shares. 
v) Tort 
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One of the judicial grounds for the lifting of the corporate veil is the tort. However one 
must take into consideration that it is a rare phenomenon for the english courts to use 
tort remedies to lift the corporate veil. Such practice is not common in Common Law 
jurisdictions apart from Canada where there is an increasing use of tort as ground, by 
the courts, in order to bypass the Salomon principle.  
vi) Enemy Character 
In times of war the court is prepared to lift the corporate veil in order reveal who are the 
actual controlling shareholders of the companies. This is what happened in the 
Daimler Co Ltd v Continetal Tyre and Rubber Co case  where german shareholders 62
held the shares of an English company during the time of First World War. 
vii) Tax 
At times tax legislations lead to the lifting of the corporate veil. The courts are also 
prepared to disregard the separate legal personality of companies in cases which there 
is tax evasion or over-liberal schemes of tax avoidance without any necessary 
legislative authority. In cases as being described above the courts have occasionally 
dismiss the company as a mere sham.    63
2.3 GROUNDS UNDER WHICH THE CORPORATE VEIL IS LIFTED IN CYPRUS 
!
Type Of Cyprus’ Legal System 
The Cyprus legal system is largely based on common law and consequently Cyprus, 
as a former British colony, inherited common law doctrines and principles which were 
codified into legislation when the Republic of Cyprus was established in 1960. Such 
principles are of course, the common law and equity principle and Cyprus as a genuine 
common law country has widely recognized and further applied English case law as a 
valuable guidance to the Cyprus courts. The absolute dependence of the Cyprus law to 
the UK law is clear in the corporate law of the two countries too as Cyprus’ Companies 
Law is extensively based on English Law, particularly in the field of commercial and 
private transactions. Thus, it is not a coincidence that in essence the Companies Law, 
Cap. 113 reproduces almost verbatim the Companies Act of the United Kingdom 
(1948). However, since the accession of Cyprus to the European Union several 
amendments have been made in order Cyprus’ national legislation to be aligned with 
the EU legislation. Nevertheless, such amendments did not occurred in the field of 
Cyprus Companies Law as the national corporate legislation remains strictly connected 
or possibly almost a reproduction of the English Companies Law. 
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Regarding the lifting or piercing of the corporate veil in Cyprus, it is quite clear from the 
already given analysis of this paper that Cyprus has adopted the basic common law 
principle, which firstly appeared in the United Kingdom, according to which a company 
“is at law a different person altogether” from its shareholders, directors, or secretary 
and it is not in law the agent or trustee of any of them. As a result, the basic 
characteristic of a Cyprus limited liability company which is a characteristic of the 
English company too, is that its members’ liability is limited to the nominal value of the 
shares subscribed by them  . Thus, the Cyprus limited liability company, following the 64
English principle, known as the Salomon principle, is accompanied by the 
consequences of the separate legal personality as the latter have been extensively 
analyzed in subchapter 1.3 and generally in the first chapter of this paper.  
However, the aforesaid principle of the separate corporate personality is also subject to 
certain exceptions in the Cyprus reality too. These exceptions allow the state or the 
courts to “lift or pierce the corporate veil” and consequently allow them to reveal the 
identity of the shareholders of the company and of course to determine the true nature 
of any specific transaction in which the company is a party. The next subchapters will 
be focused on the grounds or the exceptions which lead to the “lifting” or “piercing” of 
the corporate law as the latter have been introduced by the Cyprus law with a 
distinction in the legal piercing and judicial piercing of the corporate veil. Nevertheless, 
it is already mentioned that United Kingdom as well as Cyprus belong to the common 
law countries family and as a result it will be quite clear from the analysis above that 
the concept of the lifting of the corporate veil in the two countries is applicable almost 
under the same circumstances. Thus, I find it critical to emphasize on the legal 
elements of the Cyprus law regarding the piercing of the corporate veil that differ from 
the English law but also to quote important Cyprus case law in regard to the grounds 
that are adopted from the English law respectively. 
2.3.1 LEGAL LIFTING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL IN CYPRUS !
i) Members severally liable for debts where business carried on with fewer than 
seven                  
The first legal ground of the Cyprus law that lead to the lifting of the corporate veil can 
be found in the companies Act and more specifically in Cap. 113, article 32. According 
to article 32 of Cyprus Companies Act “if at any time the number of members of a 
company is reduced, in the case of a public company, below seven, and it carries on 
business for more than six months while the number is so reduced, every person who 
is a member of the company during the time that it so carries on business after those 
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six months and is cognizant of the fact that it is carrying on business with fewer than 
seven members, shall be severally liable for the payment of the whole debts of the 
company contracted during that time, and may be severally sued therefore.”  Thus, it is 65
obvious that the legislator tried to impose with this provision personal liability regarding 
the company debts, to any person who knowingly participated in the conduct of the 
company with intent to defraud third parties during the company's liquidation.   66
ii) Chapter 113 Article 103 (4) Companies Act                                                                                                                                                      
The next ground for the lifting of the corporate veil in Cyprus can be found in Cap. 113, 
Article 103 (4). This article introduces personal liability if an officer of a company or 
any person on its behalf: 
(a) uses or authorizes the use of any seal purporting to be a seal of the company 
whereon its name is not so engraved as aforesaid; or 
(b) issues or authorizes the issue of any business letter of the company or any notice 
or other official publication of the company, or signs or authorizes to be signed on 
behalf of the company any bill of exchange, promissory note, endorsement, cheque, or 
order for money or goods wherein its name is not mentioned in manner aforesaid; or 
(c) issues or authorizes the issue of any bill of parcels, invoice, receipt or letter of credit 
of the company wherein its name is not mentioned in manner aforesaid;  
In such a case, it is explicitly referred in Cap. 113, Article 103 (4) that the person who 
acts in such a manner will be personally liable to the holder of the bill of exchange, 
promissory note, cheque or order for money or goods for the amount thereof unless it 
is duly paid by the company.    67
iii) Civil liability for misstatements in prospectus Cap. 113, Article 43 Companies 
Act 
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third parties during liquidation procedure it is important to mentioned another legal 
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Article 43 of Cyprus Companies Act reads as follows: 
“Where a prospectus invites persons to subscribe for shares in or debentures of a 
company, the following persons shall be liable to pay compensation to all persons who 
subscribe for any shares or debentures on the faith of the prospects for the loss or 
damage they may have sustained by reason of any untrue statement.” Moreover, there 
is no doubt that Cap. 113, Article 43 belongs to the legal grounds for the lifting of the 
corporate veil as the application of the latter imposes on directors the obligation to 
proceed to compensation payment to those who suffered damage by reason of any 
untrue statement in the call. 
iv) Keeping of books of account - Financial statements 
Cyprus Companies Act introduces the responsibility of the directors of the company “to 
keep the books of accounts which are considered necessary for the preparation of 
financial statements in accordance with this Law.”   The violation of the aforementioned 68
obligation by the directors of the company constitutes a legal ground for the lifting of 
the corporate veil. More specifically Cap 113 article 141(4) introduces straight liability in 
a case where a director of a company fails to take all reasonable steps to secure 
compliance with the provisions of article 141. In such a case “the director  shall commit 
a criminal offense and on conviction thereof be liable to imprisonment……”.  
v) Obligations of the Directors as to the Administration and Management of the 
Company 
Article 169F of Cyprus Companies Legislation refers to the actions that shall be taken 
in the event of significant loss of share capital. In light of the above, based on Cap 113 
Art.169 in cases in which public companies have lost more than 50% of their share 
capital due to damages or other reasons are obliged to convene an extraordinary 
general meeting of shareholders to discuss whether it should take similar measures or 
whether there is a need to dissolve the company. “Failure by the directors of the 
company to act as above, shall constitute a civil offense and shall render them 
responsible for compensation. Such responsibility shall be personal, unlimited, joint 
and several.”   Thus, it is quite clear that the aforementioned article introduces straight 69
liability to the directors of the company and undoubtedly constitutes a legal exception 
of Cyprus Law to the Salomon principle. 
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!  Cap 113, Article 141 Cyprus Companies act. 68
 http://www.olc.gov.cy/olc/olc.nsf/all/E1EAEB38A6DB4505C2257A70002A0BB9/$file/The
%20Companies%20Law,%20Cap%20113.pdf?openelement
!  Cap. 113, Article 169F (2) 69
 http://www.olc.gov.cy/olc/olc.nsf/all/E1EAEB38A6DB4505C2257A70002A0BB9/$file/The
%20Companies%20Law,%20Cap%20113.pdf?openelement
However, although the most important source for the legal grounds of the lifting or 
piercing of the corporate veil is the Cyprus Companies Act, Cap 113, in Cyprus law one 
can find legal grounds for the lifting of the corporate veil in other legislations too, such 
us in the Criminal Law provisions, Tax  Law provisions, Public Law provisions , etc.   70
2.3.2 JUDICIAL LIFTING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL IN CYPRUS 
As already mentioned above Cyprus, as a common law country, has recognized and 
further introduced case law from its courts as well as from courts of other common law 
countries (United Kingdom, India, Canada , etc.) as a main source of its national law. 
Thus, it is quite important to mention that Cyprus courts have repeatedly followed the 
approach of the English courts regarding their decision for the lifting of the corporate 
veil and it is not surprising at all, that as per the judicial grounds of the lifting of the 
corporate veil between UK and Cyprus there is a complete identification. Consequently, 
in this subchapter I will focus on the judicial grounds of the lifting of the corporate veil in 
Cyprus, trying of course to avoid any repetition, as a full analysis of the topic was given 
in previous subchapter which was dedicated to the judicial grounds of the lifting of the 
corporate veil as being introduced by English courts. Furthermore, in this subchapter I 
will refer to the most important case law of the Courts of Cyprus which in cases 
approve or refuse the lifting of the corporate veil in order to have a more clear view on 
how the judges in Cyprus reacted to cases related to possible lifting of the corporate 
veil and which judicial grounds have been recognized by them through their decisions 
all over the years. 
Overview Of Cyprus’ Case Law Route Regarding The Lifting Of The Corporate 
Veil 
Historically speaking, taking a look at the case law of the Cyprus Courts regarding the 
lifting of the corporate veil over the years one would notice that Cyprus courts were in 
principle very reluctant to lift the corporate veil in their examining cases. This can be 
understood from their initial decisions in which without a doubt Cyprus courts showed 
unwillingness to recognize any ground that could justify a lifting of the corporate veil 
and totally remained stable to the Salomon principle. In light of the above it is important 
here to quote a landmark decision for the Cyprus courts, the Michaelides case   in 71
which the Cyprus Supreme Court emphasized in the Salomon principle and the same it 
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Article 51A of the Assessment and  Tax Collection Law, 
 http://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/taxdep.nsf/All/F0A697ED5915F58BC2257DCF004020AF/
$file/1978_004_and_1963_53_VEVEOSEOS_KE%20_ISPRAXEOS_FORON_-
_2016_037.pdf
! Michaelides v. Gavrielides (1980) 1 C.L.R. 2471
has been upheld by Cyprus courts ever since  . More specifically, Cyprus Supreme 72
Court held that: 
"We consider it necessary to note that ever since Salomon v. Salomon decision, it has 
been repeatedly said that the company and the person or people who founded the 
company are separate legal entities, regardless of the absolute control exercised by 
one or more of these persons on the company. This is the essence of the registration of 
a limited liability company and it would be against the provisions of the Company Law 
to deviate from this principle”. Thus, there is no doubt that Michaelides v. Gavrielides, 
(1980) 1 C.L.R. 244 can be characterized as the judicial continuance of the Salomon 
case in Cyprus and consequently has been a guideline for the Cyprus Courts 
examining whether they should lift or not the corporate veil.   73
The aforementioned strict approach was followed by the Cyprus courts until 1985, 
when was firstly held that under certain conditions and circumstances and of course in 
some specific cases, the lifting of the corporate veil could be justified. However the 
courts did not specified or determined what that specific circumstances could be.  74
Nevertheless, Cyprus case law all over the years showed that following English case 
law and more specifically following the landmark case Adams v. Cape Industries 
case, has established a number of relevant principles, which must be applied, when 
deciding whether the corporate veil may be lifted  . Such judicial ground which can be 75
characterized as the main judicial ground for the lifting of the corporate veil was 
recognized by the Cyprus courts in Onisiforou case  in which the court held that in 76
cases where the incorporation of a company is used as a fraudulent mean or even 
regarding some issues related to tax law, and in other cases, which the legal literature 
deals in detail with, the lifting of the veil of legal personality is applied. More specifically, 
in the aforementioned case the Cyprus Supreme court held that “the independent legal 
status of a limited liability company by its shareholders has embedded Case Salomon. 
There is no existing case law which lifts the corporate veil to justify the avoidance of 
tax. The corporate veil is lifted only to prevent illegality or fraud of public money.” This 
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! The Bank of Cyprus (Holdings) Ltd. v. The Republic (1985) 3 C.L.R. 1883,Peletico Ltd. 72
v. Republic (1985) 3 C.L.R. 1582.
! In Bank of Cyprus (Holdings) v. Republic of Cyprus the Court referred to the 73
Michaelides case as follows: “Michaelides v. Gavrielides, (1980) 1 C.L.R. 244, a rent 
control case, left no room for lifting the veil of corporation under any circumstances. We 
are of the view that notwithstanding what was said in Michaelides case, in a proper case 
there may be exceptions to the rule in Salomon case.”
! Bank of Cyprus (Holdings) v. Republic (1985) 3 C.L.R. 188374
!  Cases of Apostolou v Ioannou (2012), Hadzigavriel v Ellinas Finance Public 75
Company Ltd summarized the grounds which lead the Cyprus courts as the English 
courts to exercise their jurisdiction to lift the corporate veil.
! ! Tαµείο Πλεονάζοντος Προσωπικούv. Παναγιώτας Ονησιφόρου (1989) 1 ΑΑΔ 5047676
position has also been reaffirmed by the Cyprus Supreme court in Multi Klima Maliotis 
Engineering Ltd case   stating that: "... the principle of separate legal entity of the 77
companies came from very old (Salomon v Salomon & Co 66 LJ. Ch. 35). The courts 
have ever since demonstrated their willingness to lift the corporate veil where corporate 
property is used either for illegal or improper purposes.” In Exalco case   the Supreme 78
Court refused to examine possible lifting of the corporate veil as the parties did not 
raised an allegation of fraud.  
To this end in the next paragraphs I will make a distinction of the most important cases 
in which the Cyprus courts have either refuse or approve the claim of the lifting of the 
corporate veil, in order to examine the exact judicial grounds for the lifting of the 
corporate veil by the Cyprus Case law. 
i) Cases in which the Cyprus courts refused to lift of the corporate veil 
Cyprus’ courts have always been stable to the Solomon principle and consequently in 
numerous cases have refused to lift the corporate veil. To be more specific, one could 
notice their refusal to lift the corporate veil in cases where renting law is applicable  . 79
The court has also refused to lift the corporate veil in a case which dealt with the 
compensation for redundancy where an employee of a family company was transferred 
to another company, which had the same shareholders and managers with the first 
company. The court here held that the employment relationship with the first company 
is considered to have stopped and that in this case the veil could not be lifted by the 
courts by claiming that the employment relationship continued from the first company.  80
Additionally, one can find other cases in Cyprus case law in which the courts have 
refused to lift the corporate veil. More specifically and in addition to the above, the 
courts have refused to lift the corporate veil in cases of imposing capital gains tax on 
profits from the sale of subsidiary shares   as well as in cases of recognition of a group 81
as a single entity for purposes tax imposition  . 82
ii) Cases in which Cyprus courts “lifted or pierced” the corporate veil  
  -! -24
! Multi Klima Maliotis Engineering Ltd v. Κυπριακής Δηµοκρατίας, Συνεκδικαζόµενες 77
Υποθέσεις 483/97 και 484/97, ηµεροµηνίας 18/02/2000(unpublished)
! Exalco S.A . ν. Αλουµινέξ Λτδ κ.α. (2007) 1 B ΑΑΔ 99178
! Κυριάκος Γαλίδης v. Zako Estates Limited (1989) 1 ΑΑΔ 49079
!  Tαµείο Πλεονάζοντος Προσωπικού v. Παναγιώτας Ονησιφόρου (1989) 1 ΑΑΔ 50480
! Ανδρέας Γεωργίου ν. Κυπριακής Δηµοκρατίας διά του Διευθυντή του Τµήµατος 81
Εσωτερικών Προσόδων (1994) 4Β ΑΑΔ 770. 
! Bank of Cyprus (Holdings) v. Republic (1985) 3 C.L.R. 1883 and βλ. Stereo 82
Development Co. Limited v. Έφορου Φόρου Εισοδήµατος (1998) 4Α ΑΑΔ 651  
In the previous section I referred to the most important case law in which the courts 
showed their unwillingness to lift the corporate veil. However, taking a deep look at the 
case law one can find cases in which the Cyprus courts have lifted indeed the 
corporate veil. The grounds that led the courts to lift the corporate veil can be found in 
cases where a company tried to break the confidentiality of the tenders and 
consequently to violate free competition.   In Othon Galanos case, the two offers were 83
submitted and signed by the same person representing two companies and 
consequently the court lifted the corporate veil as the aforementioned action 
constitutes a straight violation of free competition. Another case where the Cyprus 
court lifted the corporate veil is the Ioannou case   where the company here was 84
incorporated and took over the assets and operations of another company with the 
same shareholders aiming to avoid to pay off its creditors as being determined by the 
judgement. 
Thus, it is quite clear that Cyprus Courts following the English courts have all over the 
years been reluctant to accept claims based on piercing of the corporate veil and 
consequently, such claims have been successful only in very limited circumstances. 
However, above the aforementioned reluctance of the Cyprus courts to lift the 
corporate veil, one can notice from the Cyprus case law that the lifting of the corporate 
veil has in exceptional circumstances been applied by the Cyprus courts too, especially 
where the company in question, is a sham or façade and has been used by its 
controller for an improper purpose. In such cases where the concept of a company 
accompanied by the principle of the independent legal personality is misused for 
fraudulent purposes the courts are always ready to lift the corporate veil. 
2.4  A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE APPROACH ADOPTED IN UK AND IN 
CYPRUS REGARDING THE LIFTING OF THE CORPORATE VEIL 
!!
In this subchapter, I aim to give a comparison of the approach of UK and Cyprus 
regarding the lifting of the corporate veil. What one must take into consideration when 
examining the approach of the UK and Cyprus regarding any corporate issue and more 
specifically regarding the lifting of the corporate veil is that the existing corporate law in 
the two countries is almost the same. It has repeatedly mentioned in this study that 
Cyprus as a genuine common law country has reproduced the English companies Act 
in its own company legislation. Consequently, it is a common phenomenon for the 
Cyprus courts to follow the approach of the UK Courts and this tactic is also followed 
by the Cyprus courts when examining possible lifting of the corporate veil. Thus, there 
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! Σοφούλλα Ιωάννου κ.α. v. Polly-Frocks Ltd (2000) 1Α 39884
is no doubt that in the following comparison one will find more similarities between the 
approach of each country than differences. 
First of all, I find it critical to note that both countries have adopted the Salomon 
principle and consequently due to its benefits  , the most commonly used forms of 85
legal entities in the two countries is the form of a limited liability company. Thus, the 
first similarity of the two countries is noticeable in their common approach regarding the 
adoption of the general principle of the separate legal personality. However in contrast 
to the aforementioned principle, both countries have introduced an exception to the 
latter, which is known as the mechanism of the lifting of the corporate veil under which 
both countries either by using a legal provision or a judicial ground do lift the corporate 
veil. This lead us automatically to a significant similarity of the approach of the two 
countries for the lifting of the corporate veil which is the distinction of the grounds that 
can lift the corporate veil into the legal grounds and the judicial grounds. These legal 
provisions are most commonly seen in the Companies Act of each country, but in both 
countries legal provisions for the lifting the corporate veil can also be found in other 
legislations  . Examining the legal grounds of each country it is understood that there 86
are common legal provisions in the two countries but there are also some 
differentiations. More specifically, it is obvious that both countries have introduced 
specific legal provisions which mostly cover fraudulent acts by the members of a 
company, meaning that the legislator was aiming to secure that the company will not be 
used as a mean of the members of a company in order to serve their own fraudulent 
interests. This can be clearly understood in the legal provisions of each country that 
were quoted in chapter II.   Additionally and further to the common legal provisions in 87
regard to fraudulent actions by the members of a company, the two countries have also 
commonly introduced through a legal provision straight liability for the members of a 
company for debts where business carried on with fewer than seven.   However, 88
beyond of the identification of the legal provisions between the two countries one can 
note differences too, as Cyprus has further extended the legal provisions for the lifting 
of the corporate to other reasons, instead of the situation where the members of a 
company acted fraudulently. Without any doubt, this is a differentiation of the Cyprus 
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!  The next chapter will focus extensively on the benefits and problems that occur from 85
the Salomon principle.
! Such as in tax law, criminal law, etc. See subchapter 2.3.186
!  More specifically in Section 213-215 of Insolvency Act 1986 (UK) dealing with 87
fraudulent and wrongful trading as well as in Sections 216--217 of the Insolvency Act 
1986 (UK) regarding the fraudulent abuse of a company name. Similarly, Cap. 113, 
article 32. of Cyprus Companies Act deals with any person who knowingly participated in 
the conduct of the company with intent to defraud third parties during the company's 
liquidation.
! The truth is that such a legal provision is rarely invoked especially in Cyprus and has 88
been deleted from the new Companies Act of UK. (2006).
legislator, who introduces also liability to the officers of the company in cases of a 
failure of the latter to fulfill their legal obligations of their position as a director.    89
Moving on with the comparison of the judicial grounds of the lifting of the corporate veil 
it is obvious that the approach of the courts of each country regarding the examining 
issue is almost identical. This can be understood if we take into consideration the 
Cyprus’ courts dependence to the English courts. This dependence can be clearly 
identified in the judicial grounds for the lifting of the corporate veil as Cyprus’ courts 
have repeatedly used the reasoning of the english courts when examining possible 
lifting of the corporate veil. However, it is quite important to note here that although the 
courts in UK and in Cyprus are very reluctant to lift the corporate veil in their cases, the 
number of the cases in which the lifting of the corporate veil has been applied is higher 
in UK than in Cyprus. This can be justified by the approach of the two countries, as the 
courts of UK have recognize more judicial grounds for the lifting of the corporate veil 
than Cyprus. More specifically, Cyprus’ courts following the English courts do lift the 
corporate veil mostly in a situation where a company, is a sham or façade and has 
been used by its controller for an improper purpose. On the other hand, English courts 
have extended their grounds for the lifting of the corporate veil instead of fraud in other 
situations such as in agency, torts, single economic unit, etc. However, according to the 
comparative analysis above and despite the slight differentiations in each country it is 
absolutely clear that UK and Cyprus have adopted the same approach regarding the 
lifting of the corporate veil. 
!
Chapter III 
Overall critical assessment  
Salomon principle constitutes a vital tool for the development of the economy of the 
countries have adopted it  . Thus it is not excessive to characterize the separate legal 90
personality and limited liability of the companies as a pole for attracting investments 
and funds to the countries. This is what also happens in UK and in Cyprus where one 
can notice that due to the concept of the separate legal personality the percentages of 
new companies incorporations are rising radically. This developing investment trend in 
the two countries, can be justified if we take into consideration a significant benefit that 
the separate legal personality offers which is the opportunity to invest and trading with 
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!  This is the cases as has been analyzed in subchapter 2.3.1 where it is noted that 89
directors may have straight liability in case of failure to fulfill their obligations such as 
management obligations, for misstatements in prospectus or for their failure to keep the 
books of account that are necessary for the preparation of the financial statements.
!  The importance of the Salomon principle as well as the concept of limited liability was 90
explicitly referred also in subchapter 1.4.
low risk. What we mean by the term low risk is that the shareholders of the company 
who may also be potential investors or traders are liable only on the par value of their 
shares.   Furthermore, much of the businesses today due to the extension of the 91
Salomon principle are now carried out through a group of holding and subsidiary 
companies rather than a single company. Thus, there is not doubt that the concept of 
separate legal personality constitutes a vital tool as it gave a strong financial injection 
to the countries have adopted it.  
However, the concept of the separate legal personality has been under the spotlight 
and has received a lot of criticism so far. Thus, I find it necessary in this study to note 
my critical assessment too. Despite all the financial opportunities the two concepts of 
separate legal personality and limited liability offer, the latter can definitely be criticized 
as per their negative aspects. The negative aspects can be understood from the 
creditors’ point of view, meaning that the creditors’ claims due to the consequence of 
the limited liability principle are restricted to the company’s assets. This practically 
means that the creditors of a company cannot assert their claims against the 
shareholders’ assets, at the same time that shareholders benefit from the profits of a 
company. It is clear that the creditors are unsecured and they bear the whole risk.  
 If Salomon principle applied inflexibly, it can shield parties unreasonably, to the 
detriment of persons dealing with companies.   This is also my opinion as I strongly 92
believe that for the reasons analyzed above the separate legal personality of the 
companies should have some limits, meaning that it is important that sufficient 
information about the prosperity of a particular company should be available to 
creditors in order to promptly decide whether or not they would invest their money into 
the business. And, of course, sufficiently flexible regulative frameworks  are necessary 93
in order to protect investments and combat fraudulent behavior. Taking a look at the 
business reality in UK and in Cyprus I find it very important to strengthen their legal 
provisions for the lifting of the corporate veil as fraudulent use of the company is a 
common phenomenon. Furthermore, I believe that the courts should have a more 
active role when examining potential lifting of the corporate veil meaning that they 
should enrich their judicial grounds in order to cover a wide variety of violences to the 
concept of the separate legal personality. Even morally speaking, current legal 
provisions and judicial grounds should be strengthen as they currently seem 
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! ! H Leigh Ffrench, Guide to Corporations Act, 4th edition, Butterworths, Sydney, 1994, 9292
p 19.
!  It is not surprising at all that following the Salomon case, the Parliament in UK has 93
enacted in the Companies Act 1900 provisions requiring public registration of charges on 
company property and by the Companies Act 1907 enabled liquidators to avoid floating 
charges given to secure pre-existing debts.  
inadequate to cover the injustice arising from the misuse of the concept of separate 
legal personality. So, to sum I totally support the concept of the separate legal 
personality with its benefits as mentioned above, but I strongly believe that the concept 
should have some legal limitations. 
!
Conclusions 
Without a doubt, this paper delivered one of the most fundamental principles of 
corporate law in common law jurisdictions, namely the principle of the separate legal 
personality as the latter was expressed in the so called decision by the English courts, 
the Salomon case. It is moreover clear that in respect to Salomon principle the 
corporation is such an autonomous legal subject and consequently, the corporate 
entities with limited liability are separate from their shareholders. However, the 
aforementioned principle can be under specific circumstances lifted or pierced either 
based on a legal provision or by the courts based on judicial grounds. The lifting of the 
corporate veil remains one of the most controversial subjects in corporate law and as 
discussed in the essay, the doctrine remains only an exceptional act as the courts in 
principle respect the Salomon principle.  
Examining the approach of UK and Cyprus regarding the corporate veil, this study 
focused on the legal grounds for the lifting of the corporate veil of each country on the 
one hand and on the judicial grounds on the other hand. In general the approach of the 
two countries is identical and mostly cover cases where a limited liability company is 
used as a mean of fraud. In such a case there are  specific legal provisions and judicial 
grounds which lead the courts to disregard the separateness of the corporation and 
hold a shareholder responsible for the corporation's action as if it were the 
shareholder's own.   However, as already mentioned above the courts of both 94
countries are extremely reluctant to lift the corporate veil as in principle are stable to 
the Salomon principle. This approach seems to be inadequate in my opinion in order to 
secure the genuine character of a limited liability of a company. The concept of 
separate legal personality of the companies should be the rule indeed, but the 
legislator and the courts have to be ready to set some limitations to it by lifting the 
corporate veil. 
!
!
!
!
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